Plato's Philosopher Kings, The Republic, and the Ideal Political State: An Essay
- Cody Mitchell
- May 4
- 12 min read
Introduction: Plato's Republic
In his classic work, the Republic, Plato argues that, in the ideal political state, power should be entrusted into the hands of true philosophers.
This essay seeks to summarise Plato’s rationale for doing so and to outline the steps he takes toward ensuring that justice is preserved by these leaders. Plato’s scheme is complex and requires a great deal of context to comprehend entirely. Thus, this work is a summary only and will not provide a full background to the relevant themes in the Republic.
Drawing on Plato’s understanding of the three components of the psyche (or the soul), this essay commences by outlining his definitions of justice, to be realised in both the individual and the polis (or the political state). It attempts to show that Plato saw justice as the state of being well-ordered (or ruled by reason).
Next, proceeding on this footing, it approaches the question of why Plato preferred philosophers as kings. In the Republic, there are at least three good reasons presented which demonstrate that philosophers are indeed the most suitable kind of ruler.
Firstly, given Plato’s definition of justice as being ruled by reason, it follows that those citizens who are ruled by reason (the philosophers) must govern the polis. Secondly, Plato comprehensively shows that all the characteristics most desirable in a ruler are those that follow naturally from a philosophical psyche. Most particularly, philosophers have a complete view of the form of the Good, giving them wisdom and understanding of how to rule. Thirdly, he sees true philosophers as less inclined to corruption than other personalities because they are focused not on physical pleasures but on eternal truths.
In the final section of this paper, these three points are drawn upon to prove Plato’s contention that justice is best served under the rule of philosopher-kings. Thus, it describes Plato’s approach as one of forming character in the rulers, through education, that will cause them to naturally maintain justice. Education is, therefore, a crucial factor in this process and takes place from a young age. Potential philosopher-rulers are trained, tested and scrutinised until they are at least fifty years old.
On this foundation, Plato’s theory maintains that a properly ruled individual, more than any external checks and balances, is the best protection against political corruption and injustice.
The argument of the Republic is intricate, making a complete presentation here impossible; nevertheless, this work aims to establish that the key to Plato’s ideal polis is the properly ruled individual, in whom justice is inherent.
Desire, Honour, and Reason
The idea of justice is often seen as the central theme of Plato’s Republic. Certainly, Plato spends a great deal of time defining the word through it. Much of his political theory draws on the definition he provides.
The word that is commonly translated ‘justice’ is dikaiosunē. While there is some contention over the correct translation of the word, for this work ‘justice’ will suffice.
Plato perceives justice as existing at the collective level and the personal level (Republic, 441c-d). Reeve calls these two corresponding categories of justice ‘political’ and ‘psychic’.
At both levels, there are three elements, corresponding to three types of individuals (Republic, 440e-441a). These elements (or motives) are (1) appetite, desire or gain; (2) spirit, honour or success and (3) reason, wisdom or knowledge (Republic, 435b-441b and 581c). They are stronger and weaker in different people, effectively classifying individuals according to their dominant motives and creating three groups: pleasure-lovers, honour-lovers and philosophers (Republic, 581c-582a).
The first motive, desire, is the lowest and most ignoble of the three and corresponds to the lowest and most numerous class in the state, the producers (or artisans). The second element, spirit (Republic, 581a), manifests itself in people called honour-lovers who make up the warrior class or the ‘auxiliaries’ (Republic, 441a). Lastly, people who are ruled by the motive of knowledge make up the highest class in Plato’s state: the philosophers (Republic, 442c and 473-541b).
Critically, true philosophers are always motivated by a love for, and a proper understanding of, the truth and ‘the Good’ (Republic, 508e). Thus, put simply, Plato asserts that there are three parts of human nature (desire, honour and reason) that reveal themselves (according to the ruling motive) in different kinds of people (lovers of gain, honour and truth), who, in turn, parallel three classes (producers, auxiliaries and governors).
This understanding of the elements of the psyche is crucial, for Plato, in demonstrating what it means to be just.
What is Justice?
In light of this trichotomy, Plato defines justice as the state in which each part (of the individual and the polis) is fulfilling its appropriate function (Republic, 441c-e) or, more simply, the state in which one is ‘properly ruled’.
In the individual, justice is chiefly a principle of inward character (rather than of outward action) and is reached and maintained through a correct balance of the three elements of the soul (Republic, 443b-444b). Reeve describes this as having a ‘properly ruled psyche’.
Annas describes Plato’s view of the just person as when ‘reason is ruling, spirit is ensuring that reason has adequate motivational backing and desire is acquiescing to control by the other two rather than pressing its own particular claims’.
‘On Plato’s view’, Reeve explains, ‘to be completely just simply is to be critically rational. And to be critically rational is to be motivated only by critically rational desires.’ That is to say, in a just individual, knowledge and reason should be the ruling motives (Republic, 443b-44e).
In contrast, a just polis must be one ‘that contributes as much as possible to the proper rule and happiness of its members’ and is properly ruled itself, with the three classes fulfilling their appropriate roles in the polis (Republic, 433a-434c). This interpretation of the just polis (as corresponding to the just individual) is a vital premise for Plato’s following argument for philosopher-kings (as outlined below).
As Averroes explains, ‘what is necessarily required is that justice…in the individual soul should be <the same> as in the one State’. Therefore, the definitions of both psychic and political justice are linked, or as Reeve stresses, ‘Proper political rule is proper psychic rule. Proper psychic rule is the doing and having of their own by reason, aspiration, and appetite. Proper political rule is the doing and having of their own by the philosopher-kings, guardians, and producers.’
Justice, then, is when the respective components of an entity are operating in their appropriate capacity, with reason being the dominant motive.
Why the Philosophers Must Rule
Throughout the Republic, Plato addresses the issue of why, in the ideal polis, the philosopher class is the best suited for the role of the political leader.
His justification generally takes three forms.
Firstly, he insists that the very definition of justice he has provided (and as outlined above) demands that philosophers rule. In the individual, justice can be achieved when the psyche is properly ruled, and the psyche is properly ruled when reason is the ‘controlling element’ (Republic, 443b-444e).
In the same manner, for a just polis to be realised, it must be properly ruled, and, for it to be properly ruled, those individuals who are ruled by reason and, thus, have a knowledge of the Good (namely, true philosophers) must be given political control.
This application of the elements of the soul to the polis, however, is not restricted to philosophers alone. The lower classes must also be in their correct order, with the auxiliaries (or, those who love honour and bravery) in a higher political position than the producers.
To quote Boyd, ‘if a state be just its rulers cannot but be wise [philosophers], its soldiers cannot but be brave [auxiliaries]’. A person’s ‘ruling desires’ establish what role they can appropriately perform in society.
Thus, for a polis to be actually just, desire-lovers must be producers, honour-lovers must be soldiers and wisdom-lovers must be political leaders.
The Philosopher 'King'
Plato also reasons that the qualities that flow naturally from philosophical persons are ideally suited for political leadership (Republic, 474b-c and 484a-487a).
As given by Plato, the qualities of a philosopher, says Averroes, ‘are the natural qualifications in a king’.
Plato’s list broadly includes, ‘superior’ knowledge (Republic, 484d) (‘cognitive capacity’) and greater – or, at least, equal – capacity in other ‘departments of human excellence [or virtue]’ (Republic, 484d-485a). More particularly, Plato sees honesty and dedication to the truth (Republic, 485a-d); self-control and a dismissal of ‘physical pleasures’ and money (Republic, 485d-e); kindness (Republic, 486a-b) and courage—among others—as traits essentially found in the truly philosophical individual.
Above all, the philosopher’s capacity for recognising ultimate reality causes her to be best suited for the decision-making responsibilities of government (Republic, 485c-e, 488a-489c and 490a).
Importantly, Plato argues that the genuine philosopher will not lack the capabilities of other kinds of people; rather, she can experience the ruling desires of all classes, while those in the pleasure- and honour-loving classes are limited in their experience (Republic, 582a-583a).
Accordingly, to quote Boyd, ‘with [philosophers] at the head of affairs, applying to the business of the state the best ideas about life, the ideal state would be realised’.
The Unenthusiastic Ruler
Finally, Plato points out that the philosopher’s priorities cause him to be the safest choice for political leadership as he will be the least disposed to corruption.
As Plato’s philosopher is focused on that which he loves—namely, truth and wisdom—and is focused not on material pleasures but on the mind, he will be an unenthusiastic ruler and, thus, will not fight for, or quarrel over, political power (Republic, 485d-e, 500c and 520a-521b). In Reeve’s words, a ‘wisdom-lover’s ruling desires keep his intelligence focused on the pursuit of truth’, consequently, the philosophical nature is the only sort of nature that ‘looks down on…political power’ (Republic, 521b).
Plato concludes, ‘the state whose prospective rulers come to their duties with least enthusiasm is bound to have the best and most tranquil government, and the state whose rulers are eager to rule the worst’ (Republic, 520d). Philosopher-kings will treat governing as a matter of ‘duty’ fulfilled ‘for the sake of society’; they will not exercise political power ‘for the honour they [get] by it but as a matter of necessity’ (Republic, 540b).
Hence, Plato maintains, by virtue of their character (and the qualities that flow from it), philosophers should be made kings of the state, so that true justice might be realised.
Teaching the Populace
The question remains whether justice can be sustained in the polis, but Plato is not unaware of this concern. Safeguards for the rulers, such as a simple lifestyle, heavily restricted access to potential sources of corruption and dependence on lower classes (Republic, 416c-417b and 420b-421c), are put in place.
These are not, however, Plato’s primary precautions.
Plato’s main plan to combat potential injustice in the state must be explained in two parts.
Firstly, he introduces two phases of comprehensive education to (1) develop the character of the society and the individuals in it and (2) to form the character of the polis’s future leaders. He designates his education system as the process ‘which will produce these saviours of our society’ (Republic, 502c-d).
Available to all, the initial, state-run elementary instruction instils in children the ‘sound standards of ethics’ (to use Murphy’s words) by which the polis will function and justice will be sustained collectively (Republic, 376e-335b and 541a). Elementary education aims to sustain harmony between the classes by strengthening the virtue of ‘moderation’, namely, ‘the agreement and unanimity of all three classes as to who shall be in charge’.
‘Moderation requires the rulers to impose their own desires, and the ruled to acquiesce in the imposition of these desires on them,’ explains Annas. This system is epitomised in the highly provocative foundational ‘magnificent myth’ (Republic, 414b) that describes the three classes using an analogy.
When god created the world, citizens are told, ‘he added gold in the composition of those of you who are qualified to be Rulers…he put silver in the Auxiliaries, and iron and bronze in the farmers and other workers’ (Republic, 414b-415c). This tale aims to deliver a bedrock for collective harmony, encouraging collective consent to being ruled by philosophers and upholding loyalty ‘to the state and to each other’ (Republic, 432a and 415c-d).
‘By maintaining a sound system of education and upbringing,’ argues Plato, ‘you produce citizens of good character; and citizens of sound character, with the advantage of good education, produce in turn children better than themselves’ (Republic, 424a-b).
Hence, to sustain justice and social cohesion, Plato endeavours to construct a social foundation of shared principles through common childhood education.
Training the Philosopher Kings
With these fundamental principles securely ingrained in his citizens, Plato turns to the second phase of education: namely, higher education.
These advanced forms of training seek to form the appropriate character for rulers and eliminate any unsuitable candidates through a series of character assessments and increasingly intense levels of education (Republic, 411c-414a). Schooling, for Plato, is not so much about imparting raw knowledge and information to students, but about moulding and shaping character to develop these individuals to their potential (Republic, 518a-518d and 521c).
To quote Annas, ‘Plato is the first thinker systematically to defend the notion that education is a training of character rather than an acquisition of information or skills’.
Reeve puts it this way:
‘Platonic education is aimed primarily not at the transmission of information or at the inculcation of intellectual skills, but rather at the removal or moderation of as many of a person’s unnecessary desires as his nature permits.'
The ultimate purpose of all training ‘is to bring the soul to the knowledge of the good and true’. Plato’s proposed educational curricula are as follows: after seventeen to eighteen years of early schooling, candidates participate in two years of physical instruction (Republic, 537b).
Once physical training is over, successful candidates enter into a period of education in the mathematical disciplines lasting for a full ten years (Republic, 537b-c). Mathematics serves as a groundwork for the subsequent stage of training (Republic, 537d-e), namely, dialectic, or the study of philosophy (lasting from age thirty to age thirty-five).
The philosophical study, according to Boyd, aims to draw together all the other fields of learning. Says Plato, ‘it is only the power of dialectic that can reveal [the truth], and then, only to someone experienced in the studies [of science]’ (Republic, 533a).
A final phase of education involves fifteen years of applied political experience, but it is the dialectic training that forms the character in a philosopher that will constrain him to do justice (Republic, 540a-b).
Education, Not Checks and Balances
Plato insists that the character of the rulers of his polis, as moulded by education, is of more consequence than any external checks or balances. It is, thus, vital to ensure that the motives of the soul are properly balanced, with rationality in command (Republic, 441d-442a).
Education ‘tunes up’ the reasonable element which, when appropriately balanced with the ‘spirit’ aspect, proves to be ‘the best defence…against external enemies’ (Republic, 442b). Plato argues that, by this method, ‘justice is produced’ in the individual (Republic, 444c-d).
A repeated insistence of Plato’s, Annas observes, is the theme that ‘the city stands or falls with the [ruler’s] education’. Then, again quoting Reeve, these ‘properly ruled philosophers’ will need no external checks to their authority as, for a philosopher-king ‘to act unjustly, he would have to have a character different from his actual one’.
In other words, for the philosopher-ruler to be able to be unjust, he would need to compromise his very nature. Reeve again argues that ‘any character which would allow [the philosopher] to act unjustly would result in his getting less, not more, of his favourite pleasure’.
Therefore, due to her character and, consequently, her knowledge of the Good, the philosopher-ruler will be unable to be unjust or cause injustice in the polis. Her nature has been instructed in such a way as to cause wisdom and goodness (‘the Good’) to be her ultimate object and desire.
Hence, according to her character, she will rule by ‘the Good’ and by justice (Republic, 508e). So, justice will naturally be maintained in his polis, argues Plato, when the proper rule is in place between the psychic components in the individual.
Conclusion: The Ideal State
In conclusion, Plato’s theory of the ideal polis, of which the philosopher-king is the pinnacle, is formed based on a proper understanding of various key ideas.
In particular, the notion of justice, as grounded in Plato’s conception of the elements of the psyche and the classes of the polis, is central to his argument. From this position, Plato maintains that an appropriately ruled individual (namely, a person governed by reason) and a properly governed polis (namely, one ruled by philosophers) will intuitively adhere to justice.
Education is a vital foundational aspect of his model, maintaining social cohesion and producing the state’s philosopher-kings in such a way that they are motivated by a love for the truth and the Good. The best defence against injustice, for Plato, is this knowledge of, and love for, the Good as discovered through reason.
A properly ordered society, then, is one in which each class fills their correct place, and a society in which Plato’s philosopher-kings govern is the only potential one in which justice will always be achieved.
Editor's Note: This article was first written as an essay for an undergraduate political and international studies unit on classical political thinkers. Footnotes have been removed for the sake of readability. Please contact the author if you are looking for a particular reference.
Bibliography:
Primary:
Lee, D. (ed.), Plato: Republic, 2nd edn, London, Penguin Books, 1974.
Secondary:
Annas, J. An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1981.
Boyd, W. An Introduction to the Republic of Plato, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1904.
Murphy, N.R. The Interpretation of Plato’s Republic, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1951.
Reeve, C.D.C. Philosopher-Kings: the Argument of Plato’s Republic, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988.
Rosenthal, E.I.J. (ed.), Averroes’ Commentary on Plato’s Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1956.
White, N. P. A Companion to Plato’s Republic, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1979.
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