Why were the Spaniards able to conquer Mexico and Peru so easily? Military, Technological, Religious, and Political Factors
- Cody Mitchell
- Aug 12
- 10 min read
Introduction: How did the Spaniards conquer Peru and Mexico so easily?
Adequately explaining the ease of the Spanish American conquests is a difficult task. It should first be clarified that these were not, in one sense, ‘easy’ for Cortés and Pizzaro.
They were lengthy, vicious and bloody campaigns that cost many Spanish lives. However, in another sense, it is well-nigh incredible that so few men could bring down these two powerful American empires.
This paper divides the many reasons for this into three broad categories.
Firstly, various military and technological dynamics played in favour of Cortés and Pizzaro.
Secondly, it explores the more important diplomatic and political factors that influenced the invasions; namely, the civil unrest and instability present in both empires and the local alliances that Cortés formed during his campaign.
Finally, this essay mentions the actual and potential impact that American religious and cultural traditions had on the success of the conquests.
Ultimately, it argues that there were a multitude of interdependent factors that impacted the success of the Spaniards in their campaigns. No one determinant can be identified as the reason for the Spaniards’ success.
Nevertheless, it argues that Cortés’s alliances were particularly advantageous and the political turmoil inherited by Pizzaro was a significant key to his conquest.
Military and Technological Factors
A complicated and interrelated range of military and technical elements played important – though far from decisive – roles in both the Peruvian and Mexican conquests.
Lynch insists that Spain was well suited to the ‘role of conqueror’ and that her military technology was particularly effective ‘as an instrument of power’. Among the technological reasons for this was the fact that Spanish conquerors possessed iron armour and weapons.
The Americans, in contrast, used copper and other softer metals – the Peruvians used a brilliant mix of gold and copper called champi. Further, Spanish swords, lances, crossbows and – although few – firearms proved to be considerably superior to the macanas (sharp, obsidian-edged clubs), spears, lances, bows, darts and slings of the Aztecs and the clubs, bows, axes, slings and javelins of the Incas.
For protection, Mexican warriors wore a strong garment that was made of quilted cotton: the ixcahuipiles. Although suited to the tropical climate (indeed, some Spaniards preferred it to their own armour), Lynch points out that the ixcuhuipiles was vastly inferior to Spanish armour in the degree of protection it provided. Similarly, the Incas used woollen or quilted cotton with wooden helmets, which, although protecting against some missiles, were far easier to penetrate than Spanish armour. Lynch and White contend that, coupled with their superior armour, Spanish swords provided the backbone of both Pizzaro’s and Cortès’s campaign arsenals.
On horseback, Spanish soldiers also used the lance to great effect. Although this is only one consideration among many, iron weaponry and superior arms undoubtedly benefited the Spanish conquerors.
War Horses: Psychological and Practical Impact
The Spanish possession and use of war horses presented a military advantage that played a decisive role in the invasions. This impact was both psychological and practical.
Tschiffely notes that as horses were not found in the new continent until the Spaniards arrived, the Peruvian Indians ‘were amazed and frightened’ when they saw the horses, at first supposing them and their rider to be a single being.
A contemporary historian, Zárate, claimed that the horses in the battle for the capture of Atahualpa were so dreaded that they caused the Indians ‘to flee in panic’ when they were attacked by the Spanish cavalry. Whether horses caused this degree of angst among Inca warriors is uncertain; however, their added weight and height in battle were certainly invaluable advantages to the Spaniards, who used them to the fullest.
According to a later American document, Mexican Indians also saw the horses as terrific ‘stags’ and feared them greatly (particularly at first when they also believed them and their rider to be one creature). Once again, whether the psychological effect is overstated here is unclear. More apparent is the fact that horses were an exceptionally effective military and practical asset. Collis describes Cortés’s mailed horses, on one occasion, as a ‘battering ram’ and, on another, as having a similar effect to ‘a tank among infantry to-day’.
Cortés said that the conquerors’ ‘lives were dependent on the horses’. Bernal Diaz del Castillo claimed that, besides God, the Spaniards ‘owed’ one particular military success wholly to their horses. As both a psychological and utilitarian factor, horses were, as Lynch put it, ‘the vital factor’, militarily speaking, in both Pizzaro’s and Cortés’s conquests.
Strategic Military Advantages
Tactically, both positive and negative dynamics contributed to Spanish success.
Firstly, Mexican military strategies were completely unsuited to Spanish technology and weaponry. As Lynch and White note, Mexican soldiers typically fought in tight groups, a tendency that provided a serious advantage to Spanish crossbowmen and musketeers. While they adapted speedily to the Spaniards’ style of fighting, White maintains that they found themselves tactically and technologically ill-matched by their opponents – particularly to begin with.
Conversely, it was the superior European technology of the Spaniards that was able to capitalise on this inequality, as their European battle tactics were entirely unsuited to the American climate and warfare. Cortés’s advantage lay in his ability to adapt quickly and confidently to local situations, as seen during the siege of Mexico.
More positively, both Cortés and Pizzaro, as well as some of their subordinates, demonstrated their capability as military tacticians on many occasions. Both used surprise attacks, shock force and disciplined, tactical retreats to noteworthy effect, making the most of their limited manpower. Due to these strategies, Collis points out, even in a pitched battle, Cortés’s men could hold their ground against thousands of Mexican troops.
In Peru, Pizzaro’s able officer, de Soto, used unpredictable, sudden attacks to surprise his Inca opponents and did not waste tactical opportunities when they presented themselves. Townsend argues that by the time of the siege of Mexico City, the Spanish had adapted their fighting techniques to the point that they ‘were nearly invincible’ in battle on ‘open ground’.
When fighting back-to-back, White notes, the Spaniards formed ‘an unbreakable square’. Further, Cortés and Pizzaro both utilised clever diplomacy to avoid, delay or lessen fighting when possible, ostensibly aware of their weakness in numbers.
Firearms: Decisive, Significant, or Insignificant?
The decisive, or even the significant, role played in either Peru or Spain by firearms has long been doubted – in part due to their small numbers and unreliability. For missile weapons, the Spanish used crossbows and some firearms – most commonly the arquebus.
Although by the time of Pizarro’s conquest of Peru, firearms had made technical advancements, they still played a relatively minor role in the campaign due to low numbers – in fact, proportionally less than in Cortés’s campaign. Perhaps more important, at least to begin with, was the significant psychological impact firearms had on the Americans.
According to a Mexican account, when a Spaniard fired an arquebus to frighten messengers sent by the Aztec king, Montezuma, the messengers ‘lost their senses and fainted away’. While the Spaniards had firearms and the Indians did not, due to their slowness, lack of numbers and general unsuitability for evolving commando-style American military tactics, they did not play a particularly meaningful role in either the conquest of Peru or that of Spain.
For Cortés, firearms acquired a new level of military effectiveness during the siege of Tenochtitlan (Mexico City). Cortés mounted cannons on his ships, giving the guns greater mobility and dramatically increasing their strategic usefulness. Lynch argues that in this instance, firearms ‘contributed significantly’ to the ultimate victory.
This was not the case in Peru, where he notes that they were ‘virtually ignored’ by historians. In fact, on one occasion, they were noticed for their ‘inefficiency’. For numerous reasons, firearms were not to play the prime role in either campaign, except in rare instances. The siege of Mexico City was the most obvious demonstration of many of the military and technological advantages the Spaniards had over their opponents. In his use of a highly integrated force of cavalry, superior infantry and firearm-equipped naval vessels, Cortés harnessed the optimum advantage from all these factors.
Diplomatic and Political Factors
Concerning diplomatic and political factors, two main circumstances played out in favour of Cortés in Mexico and one for Pizzaro in Peru.
More significant, for Cortés, than any other single factor was the incredible amount of aid afforded to him by his American allies, especially the Tlaxcalan. After a brief but vicious struggle with the Tlaxcalan army early on in the campaign, the two forces agreed to cease hostilities, and Tlaxcala proved to be a faithful ally from that point forward.
During the escape from Mexico City, the Tlaxcalans remained loyally with Cortés and his troops. Later, when his beaten and battle-weary troops reached Tlaxcala, they assisted greatly in his recovery and the military preparation for the siege of Mexico City.
As stressed by Hassig, the alliance between Tlaxcala and the Spaniards was a turning point for Cortés and ultimately provided him with the capacity and manpower to defeat the Mexican empire. Finally, during the attack on Mexico City, the Tlaxcalans and Cortés’s other American allies provided the vast bulk of his force, without which he could never have gained victory over the Mexicans.
In fact, according to Collis, during one moment in the siege, when Cortés found himself without allies, the best he could do was to hold his ground against the Mexican forces. Though many other factors weighed into his success, the assistance of the Tlaxcalan and the other enemies of the Mexicans was the decisive one for Cortés.
Pizzaro and Peru
In Peru, this was not the case at all, arguably making Pizzaro’s conquest the more incredible of the two (and certainly making it the more puzzling to explain). Pizzaro did, though, have another political advantage common to both conquests, namely, the nature of the enemy’s political system. Like their religious traditions, these factors were advantageous to the Spanish invaders.
Firstly, both of the American empires had ‘top-heavy’ political and military systems and, as Cohen notes, were ‘bound to collapse on the removal of central authority’. This suited the Spaniards quite well as, in both cases, they targeted and captured the highest political authorities – Atahualpa and Montezuma.
For Pizzaro, the more important political factor was that of political unrest and division. Zárate records that, at the time of the coming of Pizzaro and the Spaniards, a serious civil war was being waged by Atahualpa on his half-brother, Huascar. This division provided the ideal setting in which Pizzaro could attack Atahualpa’s kingdom.
Furthermore, at that particular time, Huascar’s armies had been defeated and scattered, and Atahualpa had disbanded much of his force. Thus, Pizzaro utilised to great effect a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy (wherein the enemy was already divided), and this, coupled with the successful capture of Atahualpa, was the major factor in bringing down the Inca empire. Collis and White point out that the Mexican empire also proved to be severely unstable, and Cortés exploited this to the full, gaining huge numbers of extra American soldiers from former Aztec-controlled cities that he conquered.
Quite often, as White notes, these were willing to turn on their former rulers and aided the Spanish significantly in their conquest. Therefore, both Pizzaro and Cortés benefited from the political instability in the Mexican and Inca empires at the time.
The Americans' Religious Traditions
Yet another factor may have played a huge role in the conquests (particularly that of Cortés), namely, the religious traditions of the Americans. Particularly in Mexico, as Lynch notes, no war was conducted without the appropriate religious rituals.
On several occasions, he claims, this even served to ‘alert the Spaniards’ to an imminent attack. Even more significant, though, was the obsession of Mexican warriors with capturing enemy soldiers for sacrifices. Collis and White assert that this commitment to wounding and capturing, rather than killing, was a serious handicap to American soldiers during intense battles with the Spaniards, who fought desperately to avoid being taken.
Although the Incas were also undoubtedly ardently religious (Zárate records that they ‘never undertake anything without first consulting their priests’), it does not appear that their obsession with human sacrifice was as much of a liability as that of the Mexicans.
Therefore, while impossible to quantify, the very real impact of the Aztecs’ (and possibly, to a lesser degree, the Incas’) religious and cultural view of warfare should not be ignored.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper has covered a broad range of complex and related dynamics that collectively contributed to the conquests of Mexico and Peru by the Spanish.
Most important amongst these are the political and diplomatic factors. For Pizzaro, the circumstances presented by the vicious civil war raging at the time of his arrival aided his conquest notably. In Cortés’s case, the military and economic assistance provided to him by the Tlaxcalans and his other allies was invaluable.
Other factors, most markedly the advantage of war horses, also played important parts in the conquest. Ultimately, however, there were numerous influences that both disadvantaged the Americans and benefited the Spaniards.
Collectively, these resulted in the successful Spanish conquests of Mexico and Peru. Without any one of the many dynamics above, Cortés’s and Pizzaro’s campaigns could have been significantly more challenging.
To refuse to acknowledge the relative importance of the various factors at play is to fail to recognise and fully understand the complexity of the Mexican and Peruvian invasions.
Editor's Note: This article was first written in 2019 as an essay for an undergraduate history unit on Spain and the New World. It has been published largely unaltered. Footnotes have been removed for the sake of readability. Please contact the author if you are looking for a particular reference.
Bibliography:
Primary:
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Secondary:
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Tschiffely, A.F., Coricancha, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1943.
White, Jon Manchip, Cortés and the Downfall of the Aztec Empire, New York, Caroll & Graf Publishers, 1989.
Zárate, Agustín de. The Discovery and Conquest of Peru, Bungay, Penguin Books, 1968.
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